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Foreword 
Environment and development issues are beginning to receive the attention they deserve from 
a global audience that, for the most pan, is now willing to confront these problems directly. It is 
certainly high time, since, in many cases, resolution of these issues is acknowledged to be a matter 
of global survival. 
International negotiation has become a principal approach in dealing with global and 
transboundary environmental disputes and problems. To date, most environmental issues have been 
addressed to some extent through negotiation processes, though with varying degrees of success. 
Certainly, the hallmark of environmental negotiations will be the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) scheduled for June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. 
This Executive Report highlights some of the results of a recently completed two-year analysis 
of international environmental negotiations conducted by a distinguished study team of diplomats, 
international civil servants, and scholars, and sponsored by the Processes of International Negotiation 
(PIN) Project of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Indepth analyses of eight 
major negotiations were performed - including the talks on ozone depletion, global warming, the 
transport of hazardous materials, acid rain, sea pollution, inland water pollution, desertification, 
biological diversity, and nuclear pollution -- and lessons were drawn for negotiators and diplomats, 
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, third party mediators, and researchers. 
Excerpts from that analysis are presented here. A complete description of the study and its findings 
are published in a new IIASA book, International Environmental Negotian'on, edited by Gunnar 
Sjijstedt and issued by Sage Publications. 
This ExecutiveReport accents the conclusions, insights, recommendations, and actions derived 
from this study that can benefit negotiators and policy makers in ongoing and future environmental 
negotiations. Whether or not the UNCED is successful in achieving its objectives, the lessons 
identified in this study can support practitioners participating in future environmentdevelopment 
negotiations. We believe that the conclusions reached in this research effort can contribute to more 
efficient negotiation processes and more implementable solutions to sustainable development issues. 




This study was conducted by a group of 17 negotiators, researchers, and international civil 
servants convened under the auspices of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Project of 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. The coordinator of the study was Gunnar 
Sjostedt m e  Swedish Institute of International Affairs). The other participants were Richard E. 
Benedick (World Wildlife Fund, United States), Christophe Dupont (C.R.C. Conseils Associes, 
France), Guy Olivier Faure (Department of Sociology, Sorbonne University, France), Willy Kempel 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Austria), Victor A. Kremenyuk (Institute for USA and Canada Studies, 
Academy of Sciences, Russia), Winfried Lang (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Austria), Michael 
Mortimore (Consultant, United Kingdom), Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Department of Psychology, Tufts 
University and Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School, United States), James K. Sebenius 
(John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, United States), Roderick W. Shaw 
(Global Environmental Security Project, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria), 
Bertram I. Spector (Processes of International Negotiation Project, International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Austria), Patrick Szell (International Environmental Law Division, Department of 
the Environment, United Kingdom), John Temple Lang (Commission of the European Communities, 
Belgium), Peter S. Thacher (World Resources Institute, United States), Oran R. Young (Institute of 
Arctic Studies, Dartmouth College, United States), and I. William Zartman m e  Paul H. Nitze 
School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, United States). Drs. Faure, 
Kremenyuk, Lang, Rubin, Sjostedt, Spector, and Zartman served as the Editorial Committee for the 
study effort. Dr. Spector edited this Executive Report. 
Comments in the Executive Report represent the views and opinions of its authors, and do 
not necessarily present the views and opinions of the institutions with which they are affiliated, or the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis or its National Member Organizations. 
International Environmental Negotiation: 
Insights for Practice 
Introduction 
A fundamental requirement for achieving successful solutions to the many environmental and 
developmental issues facing the global community is the design of a new and more effective approach 
to the process of international negotiation. This approach should start with a logical and open analysis 
of the situation and provide options for managing the issues. The approach must also provide a 
negotiation process based on the premise that a negotiated solution makes winners of all parties. This 
Executive Report provides the results of a two-year study focused on developing and improving 
current approaches to international environmental negotiation. 
In particular, this report excerpts conclusions and insights from the larger study that can be 
supportive of practitioners of international environmental negotiations, including participants from 
various backgrounds -- diplomats, policy makers, international organizations and civil servants, 
intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and third party mediators. These 
results are grouped into five categories which represent fundamental building blocks of the negotiation 
process: 
o Actors: Who are the major participants? 
o Structure: How do participants relate to each other? 
o Strategies: How do participants try to get what they want? 
o Process: What happens during negotiations? 
o Outcome: What are the results? 
Who are the Mqjor Participants? 
Governments - Coordinating a Multiplicity of Interests 
Many different ministries may be involved in setting a national position. These could include, 
besides the obvious ministries of foreign affairs and environment, departments responsible for science 
and technology, industry, finance, trade, defense, foreign aid, planning, energy, agriculture, 
transport, and others. As these ministries have different constituencies and interests, there are likely 
to be considerable internal conflicts before a national delegation can advance a firm position to the 
outside world. In the interagency process, one government department will generally assume the lead 
role. Many of the ministries may also insist on being represented at the international negotiations, 
which can lead to excessively large national delegations. 
In addition to the executive branch, national legislatures also play an increasingly important 
role. Parliamentary hearings are an especially useful forum for airing scientific theories and exploring 
conflicting economic and social interests. New mechanisms have arisen linking parliamentarians of 
North and South on environmental issues, providing forums for mutual education, exchange of 
information, and coordinated lobbying on specific issues such as climate change or biological 
diversity. These bodies range from subcommittees of a large, formal, and traditional institution (the 
Interparliamentary Union) to smaller groups parliamentarians for Global Action) to informal ad hoc 
networks or conferences. All of these bring national parliaments and parliamentarians closer to the 
actual process of intergovernmental environmental negotiations than ever before. 
For governments to face up to the new environmental challenges, they must reconcile a 
multiplicity of interests within their own borders. Bargaining must take place between these interest 
groupings to arrive at a single national policy -- usually a compromise position. If these intra- 
governmental negotiaions are conducted so that each party perceives some benefit, a single narional 
policy will be easier to pursue and the fhal internationally negotiated agreement will be more readily 
complied with in the longer term. 
The Scientific Community - Building Bridges to Policy Makers 
It is essential that an international scientific consensus be built that can agree on basic 
parameters and narrow the ranges of uncertainty to ensure the success of negotiations. In recent 
years, as demonstrated by their work on the ozone-layer and global-warming issues, an international 
network of cooperating scientists and scientific institutions has developed as a major new actor on the 
scene. They have been aided in this process by the catalyzing efforts of such institutions as UNEP, 
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the International Council of Scientific Unions 
(ICSU). 
In effect, there now exists a community of scientists from many nations, committed to 
scientific objectivity and welcoming cooperative research, transcending the narrow political and 
commercial interests of sovereign states. This development profoundly affected the ozone 
negotiations, operating to counterbalance the industrial lobby. In this process, the scientists 
collaborated closely with key government officials, assuming a new responsibility for the implications 
of their findings for policy options. It is i m p o m t  not only that governments provide adequate 
financing for their scientific research, but that they heed the resultant findings. 
Science, however, can be another area of potential North-South tension. While a handful of 
developing countries have first-rate scientific establishments, the preponderance of scientific research 
on env i roken ta~ l~  related subjects is concentrated in the N O & .  This is accentuated by the panoply 
of instrumentology and capital investment required for the monitoring and analysis that goes with the 
modern study ofthe environment: supercomputers, satellites, sophisticated laboratories. 
Very few scientists from developing countries were involved in the international exercises 
accompanying the ozone negotiations. Special efforts were undertaken to involve more in the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IF'CC). Lookng ahead, a persistent themefrom Zhird 
World diplomats is the need to build into furure environmental treaties provisions for training, 
technical assistance, and scient@c capaciry building in developing countries, to permit them to 
function as more equal partners in this domain. 
Secretariats - Influential Third Parties 
International organizations and their secretariats perform functions that, in many cases, are 
similar to those of third party mediators. For instance, the secretariat may supply objective 
information needed to clarify issues, summarize proceedings, and undertake systematic comparison 
of key elements in national position papers. Such activities may help negotiating parties to find 
common ground. 
Still, the role of secretariats is fundamentally different from that of a true mediator. One 
reason is that the secretariat often does not retain the necessary freedom of action. Normally, the 
secretariat functions as a mediator at the request of nations who belong to the secretariat's mother 
organization. Under such circumstances, the secretariat often has difficulties intervening at will when 
it considers the time to be right. This is a serious handicap, considering that timing is cnrcial for 
successful mediation intervention. Moreover, when the secretariat becomes an active and integral part 
of the negotiation, it may lose its status as an impartial mediator in the eyes of the national actors. 
A ripe moment can be by an effective mediator, rather than merely being sought out 
or awaited. Secretary General Maurice Strong appears to have created a ripe moment when he 
opened meetings at the 1972 Stockholm Conference by presenting a list of marine pollutants ranked 
by the severity of their impact. What he achieved, in effect, was to remind the parties to these 
negotiations about the severity of the threat posed by marine pollution to the world. In so doing, he 
succeeded in engendering some sense of the ripe moment, rather than merely waiting for it to occur 
on its own. 
Mediators may wish to make use of opportunities for informal exchange as a way of getting 
things unstuck. If the formal process of offer and counteroffer, as it takes place at the negotiating 
table, is being used to state extreme positions in public, and the disputants have reached an impasse, 
it may be wise to create opportunities for more informal arrangements. UNEP Executive Director, 
Mustafa K. Tolba, appears to have done just this during the Montreal Protocol negotiations on the 
depletion of the ozone layer. Tolba made extensive use of "informal consultations" designed to help 
narrow the gap between the divergent views of negotiators on central issues, and accomplished this 
away from the plenary session. 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) - Catalysts, Monitors and Educators 
Mobilizing the right actors at the right time is a problem of great significance. In many 
environmental cases, effective negotiations were started too late in relation to the seriousness of the 
problem. The actors who should have been mobilized were not. It would have made a great 
difference, for example, if the negotiations on the ozone layer had been started and had achieved their 
initial results 10 or 15 years earlier. This is only one area in which NGOs can make important 
contributions to environmental negotiations in the future. They may not only mobilize support for the 
negotiations generally, but also contribute to the structuring of the agenda by helping authorities set 
priorities. 
A new task for NGOs, which will probably increase in importance in the future, is to assist 
in the implementation of agreements in the area of environmental problems. One way that this may 
be accomplished is by actual supervision of governmental activities. The root cause of many 
environmental problems can be traced to the social behavior of individuals or to their common 
lifestyles. merefore, educational programs can be expected to play an important role in the 
implementation process by recommending modified behavior and lifesryles. NGOs may become 
important channels for such crucial educational programs. 
The rate of participation of NGOs in environmental negotiations has increased in recent years. 
This development is particularly evident in the prenegotiation process leading up to the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Brazil in 1992. At the meeting of the 
preparatory committee in Nairobi in August 1991, one of the most contentious issues causing highly 
intensive discussions was the role of NGOs in the UNCED process. Influential NGOs demanded 
increased access to, and participation in, the negotiations; these requests were largely obliged. It is 
interesting to note, however, that the NGOs becoming involved in the UNCED process, for the most 
part, represent interests of the developed countries. Actually, a strong constellation of developing 
countries resisted the increased presence of NGOs, as such organizations in the Third World in the 
1990s generally favor environmental concerns before the needs of development. 
Mobilization of the Public 
The importance of mobilizing the general public in support of national negotiating objectives 
is demonstrated, for example, by United States initiatives concerning the ozone problem - by the 
creative use of the media, press conferences, speeches, television, and radio, as well as of reaching 
out to foreign constituencies by encouraging US environmentalists to establish contacts with their 
colleagues overseas. 
On the other hand, policy makers may become complacent if their publics do not lobby them 
to act on vital environmental issues. Publics will not become engaged if they are not informed of 
potential threats. Educational programs are required, organized by international organizations and 
targeted at societal organizations. Their objective should be to increase the general awareness of the 
existing threats and oppommities. With such information in hand, citizens may force national actors 
to mobilize for negotiations. 
Nature - Defending the Undefended 
In the case of the biological diversity negotiations, threatened species of plants or animals 
cannot defend their own interests, however important they are in a future-oriented ecological 
perspective. These and other common interests of a similar kind need representatives. To a large 
extent, that role has been performed until now by national representatives speaking from an idealistic 
platform. Dependence on uncertain idealism is very shaky ground on which to base future global 
problem solving on biological diversity or any other environmental issue. Yet, consciousness raising 
is an important and necessary aspect of mobilizing actors. 
It is essential to search for better methods of bringing undefended collective environmental 
interests into the multilateral negotiation process. Several approaches can be explored: 
o Establish rosters of independent and highly qualified experts by 
means of internntional agreement in some appropriate international 
organization. From this roster, one expert or a team of experts 
could be selected to serve as representatives for undefended or 
weakly defended environmental interests. These representatives 
should not play the role of a mediator or that of a secretariat 
servicing a particular negotiation round. Neither should they have 
responsibilities to national delegations. Such representatives would 
constitute a new kind of actor in environmental negotiations truly 
representing collective global interests. 
o Develop institutional structure and administrative support to epistemic 
communities. Such transnational groups have emerged to function as 
driving forces in several negotiation processes, notably the 
negotiations on pollution in the Mediterranean and the ozone 
problem. 
o Enhance the access of nongovernmental organizations and selected 
international interest groups info the negotiation process. In many 
past negotiations, national governments as well as the leadership of 
international organizations have been reluctant to permit such 
representation at the negotiation table. One reason is that some 
nongovenunental organizations (NGOs), such as Greenpeace, have 
been skillful in mobilizing national and international opinion in the 
area of environmental problems. Therefore, the participation of such 
NGOs in international environmental negotiations has added an 
element of uncertainty. Notably, NGOs have been capable of 
upsetting tentative agreements by revealing the real tradeoffs of 
governments or by criticizing a government or policymaker for 
taking the wrong position in a negotiation. 
How do Participants Relate to Each Other? 
Unequal Resources - Asymmetry between North and South 
More so than in many other types of negotiation, environmental talks exhibit asymmetrical 
qualities. Wide differentials can and do exist in accessibility to scientific and technological 
information, for example. The countries of the Noah usually have the resources at their disposal to 
gather and analyze data, thus giving them a definite advantage in terms of examining possible 
solutions and trading off benefits against likely impacts on domestic interests. In an age when 
information is power, this differential gives the North a definite advantage over the South. Asymmetry 
in information resources was a contributing factor to the more passive participation of Southern 
countries at the Vienna talks on nuclear accidents. 
Moreover, such asymmetry yields dependencies for information that can easily foster 
suspicion. This point was pertinent especially in the case of the negotiations concerning the 
transboundary movement of hazardous waste, which pitted the Noah against the South in sharp relief. 
As victim, the developing countries were highly dependent on the industrialized nations for 
information during the negotiations and were concerned that the final resolution of the Base1 
Convention would not go far enough in banning transboundary movement. The resulting actions of 
the African countries are particularly telling. As a bloc, the African states adopted a joint declaration 
highlighting issues of critical interest to them which they were fearful would not receive appropriate 
treatment at Basel. In addition, none of the African countries signed the Final Act of the Basel 
Convention on the spot. 
Another dimension of asymmetry between actors in environmental negotiations deals with the 
use of strategy and power. The limited resources and assets of the South can easily lead to a 
prevalence of blocking strategies on their part. Sometimes, the only card held by the weaker party 
is to deprive the stronger actor of what it desires. While the South might not get what it wants out 
of the negotiation, it can see to it that the North will not get what it wants either. Though not an 
enlightened or progressive strategy, it may be the only way the weak can project its objectives to the 
strong. An example of this strategy was vividly portrayed by several large developing countries at 
the London meetings on ozone depletion who explicitly threatened to withhold their support for 
further restrictions on emissions if significant fmancial incentives were not forthcoming. 
How can the negative effects of asymmetry be averted? Research straregies that focus on the 
crean've distribution of information, common decision support systems, for example, or restructuring 
possible tradeoffs, might facilitate the process. 
Issue Linkages - Reality and Implications 
Tying environmental issues to development is a legitimate linkage. The imposition of 
environmental controls and regulations often does inhibit opportunities for economic growth in 
developing nations unless alternative or substitute technology is employed. But these technologies 
are generally more expensive and less available than the existing polluting options. 
How does the linkage between environment and development change the calculus in 
international environmental negotiations? For one thing, it makes already complex issues more 
complex. Cost-henefit tradeoffs must be extended to deal not only with the differentials between 
increased regulation constraint and improved environment, but with halancing this regulation 
constraint and the demands of sustainable development as well. The design of a formula that 
encompasses these divergent interests into a positive-sum solution is indeed difficult to generate. 
Moreover, this issue complexity is likely to yield agreements that are difficult to ratify or implement 
due to the many domestic interests and stakeholders that are affected. Thus, the linkage between 
environment and development demands creative approaches; drawing upon precedent will not do. 
The linkage of these two, often emotional and conflicting, objectives suggests a negotiation 
situation in which strategies and the use of power is more likely to be used in a negative fashion. 
Blocking strategies by developing countries that threaten noncompliance with new environmental 
controls are possible reactions to fears that their demands will not be satisfied. 
A restructuring of the process of environmental diplomacy is required to cope with these 
linkage problems in negotiation. Current practice must be reformed to make the negotiation process 
dealing with environmental and development linkages more manageable. 
Scientists and Diplomats - Reconciling Advice and Action 
International environmental negotiations rely heavily on complex, though often uncertain, 
scientific and technical information. This is one of the major characteristics that distinguishes these 
types of negotiations from many other types of international negotiations. Scientists, engineers, 
technologists, and futurists must sit side by side with professional diplomats for the problems to be 
understood, solutions to be devised, and progress to be made. 
The bridge between these two domains has yet to mature fully, leading to some problems and 
ambiguities. A major issue is one of negotiating about uncertain parameters. Rarely can it be said 
that all of the scientific issues being negotiated were completely understood and their future 
implications projected reliably. There are so many scientific parameters of environmental problems 
that are uncertain and so many correlations that reasonably cannot be stated as causal relationships, 
that the substance of what is being negotiated, what are appropriate tradeoffs, what are reasonable 
fallback positions, and what are effective outcomes can become rather nebulous. 
At the same time, since the potential environmental consequences are often catastrophic, 
professional negotiators are left in the unenviable position of having to negotiate issues that are ill 
defined. The dilemma they face is negotiating in this state of uncertainty only to find later that the 
problem was not as significant as once thought, versus delaying negotiation until substantial scientific 
results are available, only to find out then that irreparable damage has been done. 
Another issue revolves around the unique perspectives of the scientific expert and the 
diplomat. The position of the expert is that the environmental problem is just that, a problem that 
one seeks to resolve logically in the most effective and efficient way possible. Diplomats, on the 
other hand, view environmental talks as situations where conflicting interests must be satisfied through 
compromise. Optimal technical solutions are only as good as the feasibility of concluding multilateral 
agreements that apply them. 
The expects should not run the show, but, too, the professional negotiators must pay heed to 
the scientific implications of the alternative solutions. Negotiation outcomes that fall short of solving 
the true environmental problems or delay the process, though they are politically expedient, can be 
more damaging than no outcome at all. 
Certainly, the two perspectives of the negotiation process mentioned above can be 
accommodated. f ie  role of the eqen is to identify each scientific solution and how effective each 
is likely to be in resolving the environmental problem. f ie  role of the negotiator is to cobble an 
agreement that utilizes the solution sets at the most effective end of the continuum to maximize 
parochial interests, while offeringpositive payoffs to all other parties. The structuring of these roles 
and perceptions of the problem demand conscious attenhion to facilitate an effective partnership 
between scientist and diplomat. 
How do Participants Try to Get Wbat they Want? 
North-South - Demands and Responsibilities 
In the new global environmental negotiations, developing countries are particularly sensitive 
about being forced to undertake obligations on behalf of environmental protection that could interfere 
with their economic growth. With a rising proportion of the world's populatiowalready over 80 
percent-oncentrated in the South, potential future emissions and effluents from the developing world 
under prevailing technologies could swamp any reductions undertaken by the industrialized North. 
Developing nations stoutly maintain, however, that the industrialized countries have grown 
wealthy while, albeit inadvertently, polluting the global commons with greenhouse gases and toxic 
wastes; therefore, it is the responsibility of the North to pay for restoring the balances of nature on 
which future life on earth may well depend. In the short tun, the top priority in the South is to 
reduce poverty and raise standards of living, and if this means burning coal or cutting down tropical 
forests, with uncertain and probably adverse implications for the future, so be it. Developing country 
representatives insist that the only alternative to this course is for the South to be enabled, through 
new and additional financial assistance and technology transfer, to "leapfrog" over the polluting phase 
of the industrial-energy-agricultural revolution that began in the 18th century. 
In the North, there is a concern that donor countries not commit themselves to open-ended 
new obligations for financial assistance or technology transfer over which they have no control. In 
the South, there is often a mistrust of the motivations of the North, a pervasive anxiety about being 
relegated indefinitely to a condition of "underdevelopment," and a jealous guarding of relatively 
recently acquired sovereign rights over their own natural resources. Yet there is general agreement 
that the wealthier countries must assume the lion's share of responsibility and that the South's concern 
about equity and fairness is justified. It is the negotiators' task to translate these principles of 
equitable distribution into reasonable commitments. 
Strategy Ambiguity - Economic Push and Pull 
National objectives related to environmental negotiations are often schizophrenic. They reflect 
a push-pull phenomenon. On the one hand, national actors emphasize the costs of regulation and the 
significant constraints that regulation will place on the domestic labor force and the economy in 
general. As a result, they tend to act cautiously so as not to upset these interest groups, biological 
conservation treaties being a w e  in point. On the other hand, negotiated agreements that constrain 
emissions, for example, can be a boon to industry that now can reap the benefits of newly created 
markets for control and substitute technologies. These opportunities attract national actors to 
negotiated agreements that might stimulate such technological development. 
Many actors have not resolved this push-pull conflict in their national interests and objectives. 
This results in an ambiguous approach to internarional environmental talks that yields indecision and 
delay. In large part, this ambiguiry can be traced to pluralism within national actors. As 
environmental issues are often emotional, domestic interest groups on all sides of the issue are 
stimulated and mobilized, complicating attempts to devise coherent national negotiating objectives. 
In the case of environmental degradation in the Sahel, for many of the nations involved, negotiation 
objectives are not ambiguous, but entirely unformulated. Little consensus can be found among 
government interests on environmental problems because of political volatility and competing 
objectives focused on economic development. Moreover, educated public opinion and differentiated 
interest groups on these issues simply have not matured in some societies. 
A Tested Mechanism - The Single Negotiating Text 
A useful device that promotes a gradual convergence of views is the consolidated negotiating 
text that is not associated with any of the protagonists but rather with a neutral parfy, such as the 
chair or the secretariat. There is a tremendous eff~ciency in concentrating debates on a single text 
rather than having multiple, mutually exclusive drafts in circulation. Such a text will reflect, within 
square brackets and paragraph by paragraph, the divergent positions of countries. 
The negotiations for the Montreal Protocol opened chaotically with several conflicting 
proposals on the table. The convergence over the next two negotiating rounds of a growing number 
of countries on a single text provided an essential focus to the deliberations. This draft protocol never 
had formal status, however, until it was signed by govenunents on the final day in Montreal. Because 
it was designated as "the Executive Director's text," government representatives were not committed 
to any part of it at any interim stage in its development. This flexibility left open opportunities for 
tradeoffs and adjustments at later phases of the negotiating process. 
Preemptive Actions - Taking Unilateral Leadership 
Negotiation leadership may be attained by undertaking preemptive actions: imposition of 
controls unilaterally or by a small group of nations in advance of a broader internarional agreement. 
Such action (as in the case of the US 1977 ban on CFC aerosols) enhances the credibility of a country 
in promoting broader controls. It demonstrates willingness to take the first step. Although there may 
be some fear that domestic industry could suffer a competitive setback by such unilateral action, it 
is equally plausible that it could prove a long-term boon by stimulating investment in new 
technologies. 
Consideration of preemptive protective measures in advance of international negotiations may 
prove particularly important to the climate change issue. The industrialized countries, whose past and 
continuing use of fossil fuels are the prime cause of the greenhouse effect, could only gain in 
credibility vis-a-vis the South if they undertake serious measures to reduce their own carbon dioxide 
emissions before asking developing countries to at least limit emissions of greenhouse gases. Such 
measures would bring other advantages as well: they would buy time by delaying or reducing adverse 
environmental impacts of global warming, stimulate new technology, and legitimize change by 
undercutting the validity of arguments for delay. 
Mediation as a Strategy 
To serve effectively as an independent mediator, international organizations can arrange for 
special mediation teams to be drawn from the organization. Alternatively, these mediators could be 
drawn from independent rosters of experts. The team could consist of a group of specialists that 
would be accepted as independent, honest brokers by all negotiating parties and would be integrated 
into the organizational infrastructure of the negotiations from the start. It would have to be given a 
mandate to intervene any time it judges that such action would be constructive. If the team loses the 
confidence of the parties during the negotiations, a new preselected team should be installed. 
An example of such a team is the panel system in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). Panels consist of a few independent experts who decide whether the country being 
scmtinized has performed in line with GATT rules. It should be possible to use this GATT panel 
system as an example for mediation concerning environmental problems. Another kind of mechiism 
for mediation that has been used in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and in other organizations is the consultation of a group of "wise men." These 
acknowledged experts are rypically wed to clarify the agenda for internafional consultan'onr or 
negotiations. This approach is particularly useful for mediation in the prenegotiation stage. 
What Happens during Negohtions? 
Bilateral CommunicationlMultilateral Outcomes 
It has been demonstrated that bilateral diplomatic contacts are an essential prerequisite to a 
successful multilateral outcome. Discwsions among governments during the intervals between formal 
negotiating sessions contribute significantly to understanding nationalpositions and their underlying 
rationale and concerns, and hence to influencing a convergence. Much progress is therefore 
"invisible": what becomes apparent at the negotiating session is often less a product of that meeting 
than a result of the painstaking groundwork that had occurred, on a bilateral basis, in the weeks or 
months preceding. Ifcontact is delayed until the actual negotiating session, positions moy be set and 
therefore much harder to influence. 
Decision Support - Coping with Complexity 
Issue complexity is an inherent feature of international environmental negotiation processes. 
Three approaches to decision support can help to reduce this complexity: 
o Computer models can be used to calculate the consequences for individual narions if 
giwn proposals are implemented. Such a model was used in the Law of the Sea 
Conference. The importance of that model was that it enabled negotiating parties to 
- - - 
anticipate possible gains from concessions made and compare alternative concessions. 
Another example is the Regional Acidification INformation and Simulation (RAINS) 
model develo&l at IIASA~ which ha.  been used successfully by the UNECE in thk 
negotiations on acid rain in Europe. 
There are difficulties attached to building and using such computer models in the 
context of negotiations. First, participants in the negotiation are not likely to have 
the competence to build such models themselves; they are dependent upon researchers 
who, in turn, may not have the requisite practical experience in negotiations to add 
a necessary dimension of realism to the models. Second, the computer models may 
become so constrained by political considerations and compromises that they may 
become technically deficient. Therefore, it should be explored how independent 
competent national or international organizations can be commissioned to develop 
models that would compare gains with concessions in complex negotiations over 
environmental issues. 
o Decision suppon to help negotiators deal with process properties that hinder 
negotimMons need not be as elaborate or sophisticated as computer modeling. 
Systematic policy analyses by external advisers might also be useful. For instance, 
lessons learned from successes in similar earlier negotiations can be supportive, as 
well as illustrate the conditions for such successful outcomes. 
o Role-playing exercises and games are another useful f o m  of decision suppon for 
negotiators and policymakers. For example, a negotiation situation depicting 
pollution in the Rhine may be used in training simulations concerned with water 
rights and pollution in other rivers. 
Creativity - Overcoming Stalemate 
Increasingly fresh and creative approaches and proposals are required to deal with future 
environmental disputes. This is due to the pervasive complexity and uncertainty in the science of 
environmental issues and the global nature of these problems. Reliance on precedent established by 
previous environmental negotiations may not be sufficient to resolve tomorrow's problems. Creative 
ideas that somehow refocus or reframe the problem and modify the current reality of objem'ves are 
needed to identify solutions rha~ yield positiw suns covering all sides. This may be accomplished by 
broadening the size of the pie. offering side payments, trading off low priority issues that are viewed 
as high priority by the other side, minimizing the costs incurred by accepting the other side's 
interests, or satisfying the true interests of both sides. 
In the preparations leading to the Mediterranean pollution talks, the Stockholm Conference 
Secretariat found it useful to make analogies to earlier expert analyses concerning the health effects 
of atomic radiation. Referring to analogies is a common approach to stimulate creative results. Too, 
in the ozone-depletion negotiations, the secretariat found it effective to institute an independent legal 
drafting group during the London meetings to act as a non-evoluatiw brainstoming group, outside 
the more formal meeting structures. Again, a creativity technique was used to push the negotiations 
beyond particular stumbling blocks or potential impasses. 
Problem-Solving - Seeking a Successful Formula 
An important lesson @om many environmental negotiations is the usefirness of separating an 
issue into more manageable components rather than trying to design an ideal and comprehensive 
treaty at one stroke. Attempting to solve all aspects of a complex problem within one framework can 
prove to be a formula for delay; the perfect becomes the enemy of the good. Instead, it may be desir- 
able to work for a step-by-step consensus - incremental agreements that can be reviewed and revised 
as the negotiations progress. 
A useful element in this process can be informal fact-finding meetings that constitute a 
prenegotiation phase. Such meetings can comprise bilateral contacts among governments or larger 
workshops that involve not only government officials but also scientists, academics, and representa- 
tives of industry and environmental organizations. Participants usually attend in their personal 
capacities and not as members of national delegations with established positions. One of the most 
highly developed examples of a prenegotiation process was the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, which assembled hundreds of participants from within and outside governments for dozens 
of workshops over a two-year period preceding the formal opening of negotiations on a climate 
convention in 1991, and which has been extended in an advisory function to the negotiators. 
The Precautionary Principle - Avoiding Crisis Management 
There is a tendency to treat international environmental problems in a crisis posture. 
Unfortunately, a real or imminent catastrophe is most often the event that precipitates the need for 
negotiation. An obvious instance is the case of the Vienna Conventions dealing with nuclear 
accidents. After the Chernobyl incident, these negotiations were summoned and concluded rapidly-a 
prime example of the catalytic impact of crises - which is in sharp contrast to earlier, slow-moving 
attempts by the IAEA to motivate multilateral interest and action on the very same issues. The 
negotiation outcome provided a crisis management mechanism for use in future incidents. 
Rarely do actors deal formally with incipient problems based upon some early warning of its 
future emergence. It is not often that one observes the development of a multilateral negotiation 
regime to deal with a dispute in the making, though such noncrisis joint problem solving might be 
the most rational approach. Both the ozone depletion and Mediterranean Sea pollution negotiations, 
while conducted in reaction to various levels of environmental damage, are largely preemptive 
negotiations, averting the problem fram reaching catastrophic limits. 7 7 ~  analysis of preconditions 
that facilitated these processes should be extended to other incipient environmental problems so that 
such noncrisis regimes can be replicated. 
Coordination - A Key to Effextive Procgs  and Implementation 
International environmental negotiations proceed at many different levels, which can result 
in what appears to be ostensibly uncoordinated activity. The stimulation of interest group activity on 
environmental issues in pluralistic nations leads to extensive intra-nation negotiations during and prior 
to inter-nation negotiations, which tends to complicate the development of a coherent set of interests 
and objectives. In the case of the pollution negotiations on the Mediterranean, for each national actor, 
the number and diversity of interest groups and government ministries involved in the domestic debate 
on national policy formulation was a function of the multiple dimensions from which the negotiations 
were viewed-maritime commerce, fisheries, health, environment, and tourism, to name a few. 
Skillhl internal negotiations were required to achieve a sense of positive-sum outcome among these 
varied domestic groups. 
When dealing with coalition behavior, as with the European Community (EC) in the ozone- 
depletion negotiations, another level of internal coordination is required. The strains and divergence 
of interests within the EC coalition prior to the Vienna Convention were many and required extensive 
intra-coalition bargaining before an integrated single approach could be generated. 
Coordination is also required between experts and policy makers. In the Mediterranean 
pollution negotiations, for example, the 1972 Stockholm Conference Secretariat recognized a 
difference in the nature of the interchange between experts and diplomats and, as a result, encouraged 
the use of soft-law techniques to benefit from these differences. More frequent informal exchanges 
among technical experts were promoted to build the technical norms, standards, and agreements that 
the negotiators could then use to resolve disputes at the policy level. Thus, the mode of 
communication and the roles played by these two groups of actors was structured to ensure that they 
were complementary. 
In a similar vein, in the w e  of biological conservation negotiations, the design of treaty 
implementation structures took into account the difficulties in communication that sometimes plagues 
scientific and diplomatic players in negotiation. Implementation clearly is best lep to independent 
scientists, rather than diplomats or administrators, who can regularly assess needed improvements 
in the operation of a regime based on the evolution of scientific and technical knowledge in the field. 
At the same time, some negotiation cases have exhibited effective coordination between the 
technical experts and diplomats. Again in the Mediterranean pollution case, a multidisciplinarygroup 
of expens assembled from various interested UN organizations established a common definition of 
the problem and a common language that facilitated discussions at the policy level. The IAEA draft 
conventions on nuclear safety developed by technical experts served a similar purpose of enhancing 
communication among the policymakers once the negotiation got under way. 
A third potential source of uncoordinated activity stems from the fact that while environmental 
issues, by their very nature, may have to be negotiated at the international level, they are implemented 
and regulated at much lower levels. For implementation to be a faithhl representation of the intent 
of negotiated agreements, existing local regulations must be adaptable and local authorities induced 
to be compliant. Again, to cause these local actors to behave as intended may require extensive 
domestic negotiations. For example, in the case of acid-rain regulations in the United States and 
Canada, the standards imposed by Clean Air Acts or any future negotiated agreement must be 
implemented by the states and provinces, respectively, who will not be direct participants in the 
negotiations themselves. In biological conservation negotiations, local and regional authorities, of 
necessity, play a significant role in the implementation of land-use and natural reserve plans that are 
agreed to in negotiation. Coordinationproblems can ofen be solved through restructuring the formal 
institutions or infonnalprocesses of negotiation. 
What are the Resub? 
Adaptable Formulas 
Looking back, the Montreal Protocol may be a paradigm for a new negotiating approach 
mandated by threats to the global environment. The treaty contained explicit procedures to facilitate 
its adaptation to evolving conditions. And any such revisions would be based upon regularly 
scheduled periodic reassessments of the changing science, of environmental impacts, of economic 
factors, and of technological advances -- a process that came to involve the mobilization of hundreds 
of international experts in a path-breaking and innovative exercise. 
Most negotiations of the past have been undertaken in order to set an international decision 
in concrete. In contrast, the Montreal Protocol points the way toward a new concept, in which the 
negotiators deliberately avoided a static solution, and designed a dynamic and flerible instrument 
capable of responding to changing circwnstances. Thus, the experience of the ozone treaty may offer 
hope that it is possible for sovereign nations to agree on cooperative and costly actions even in the 
face of scientific uncertainty and remote threats-utilizing the skills of negotiation in the longer-term 
perspective of stewardship of the planet. 
Waiting for Global Participation? 
Mitigating a global danger such as ozone layer depletion or climate change requires virtually 
universal participation to be truly effective. However, at some point negotiators must determine 
whether to go ahead with a less than optimal number of signatories or to delay the process to obtain 
wider agreement. They must assess the benefits -- substantive and psychological - of a formal 
agreement involving fewer nations against the potential of nonparties undermining the treaty's impact 
as free riders or pollution havens. 
Going Beyond "Best Available Technology" 
Negotiators of environmental treaties involving controls-for example, dealing with hazardous 
materials, sulfur dioxide, or CFC emissions, pollution of the Rhine or of regional seas-must decide 
whether to link such controls with the best available technology (BAlJ or whether to mandate 
technology-forcing targets. BAT clauses in effect ratify the status quo; the Montreal Protocol 
negotiators decided this was an insufficient response to the threat to the ozone layer, and established 
target dates for a phasedown of CFCs before alternatives were developed. 
This philosophy was evident in Germany where the Environment Minister Klaus Toepfer had 
maintained that he was convinced that if given a clear-cut timetable, industry would be stimulated to 
come up with substitutes, whereas if industry were given more time, it would take more time. The 
international chemical industry long claimed that it would be impossible to find practicable substitutes 
for CFCs. Only in 1986, when the prospects of internationally agreed controls became serious, did 
they resume, after a several-year hiatus, serious research into substitutes. And within the first year 
after the Montreal Protocol was signed, the initial research results made a total phaseout of these 
chemicals a practicable goal. 
Regime Formation - The Role of International Organizations 
How effective are international organizations as instruments of regime formation with regard 
to environmental issues? The evidence suggests that the record in this area is mixed. For the most 
part UNEP has been a success story, and much the same can be said of the role of the ECE with 
regard to transboundary air pollution and of the IMO in the case of the regime established under the 
terms of the 1973-1978 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). The same 
is true of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (TUCN) - 
a hybrid between a nongovenunental organization and an intergovernmental organization - in 
connection with biological conservation regimes likethe arrangements for trade in endangered species 
set up under the 1973 Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). 
In other cases, international organizations have been less successful. The OECD encountered 
significant limits in dealing both with nuclear security and with transboundary movements of 
hazardous wastes. In the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, the IAEA may well have 
set its sights too low in pushing for the adoption of the 1986 Vienna Conventions on notification and 
assistance in the event of a nuclear accident. The F A 0  has participated in establishing several 
international regimes dealing with fisheries, but, once in place, the regimes themselves have not 
proved particularly effective. Somewhat similar observations are applicable regarding the role of 
UNCTAD in establishing commodity regimes to regulate international trade in primary products, such 
as tin, coffee, sugar, and wheat. Beyond this, there are hints that international organizations can 
become overactive participants in environmental negotiations. In some cases, they have exacerbated 
the collective action problems associated with such negotiations, rather than helped to solve them, or 
have pushed for arrangements that seem attractive on paper but that are unlikely to prove workable. 
While the evidence is far from clear-cut, such problems may have occurred in the negotiationof some 
of the biological conservation regimes. 
What accounts for variations in the effectiveness of international organizations as players in 
environmental negotiations? The answer to this question undoubtedly relies on a combination of 
exogenous and endogenous factors. In the case of ozone depletion, for example, UNEP benefitted 
from strong public interest, the development of a relatively high degree of consensus among scientists 
on the issue, and the emergence of the necessary political will among the participating states. What 
is needed, in effect, is a convergence of exogenous and endogenous factors that maximize the 
effectiveness of internanrnanonal rganizations in environmental negotiations. 
Will convergences of this type occur regularly in the future and, in particular, can we expect 
them to occur in conjunction with the emerging issues of global environmental change, such as 
climate change and biodiversity? There is no basis to assume that such convergences will occur. As 
the 1989 United Nations debate on UNCED suggests, these issues may become too important and too 
politicized to be handled by an organization like UNEP, no matter how technically competent it 
seems. The issues themselves, such as the responsibility of states for environmental destruction 
occurring within their jurisdictions or the obligations of developed countries to assist developing 
countries in dealing with their environmental problems, may raise questions that can only be resolved 
at the highest political levels. Yet it would be inappropriate to form bleak conclusions about the 
probable roles of international organizations as instruments of environmental regime formation. 
Conclusion 
A major goal of the study is to support the many ongoing regional and global processes of 
international negotiation concerning environmental problems. As a result, an important objective is 
to draw lessons from earlier processes of negotiation on the environment that may be useFul for 
practitioners engaged in present or Future bargaining on these issues. We hope that this Executive 
Report has presented insights that can help participants in the negotiation process in a very practical 
sense. 
Our results suggest some important issues that need to be addressed further by practitioners 
and researchers alike: 
o Many new groups and individuals--beyond traditional governmental officials-- 
are becoming important participants in the formal negotiation process. 
Scientists, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and 
intergovernmental organizations are &ong the most active. Their roles and 
relationships to governmental delegations still require better definition. 
o The scientific community has identified many linkages between various 
environmental issues that should be addressed simultaneously. Moreover, 
policy makers have linked environmental issues with other important policy 
concerns, such as development and trade. These linkages are often very 
complex. Ways must be found to develop a common understanding of these 
linkages among interested parties for negotiations to proceed and meaningful 
tradeoffs to be made. 
o Bridging the differences between the industrialized and developing countries 
on environmental issues will be a continuing problem given their different 
interpretations of fair and equitable solutions. Is a common definition of 
fairness and equity possible? 
o New approaches to innovative problem solving--ways of searching for 
acceptable formulas--need to be found and implemented to develop the novel 
solutions that are required to overcome impasses. 
o New strategies to implement negotiated environmental agreements need to be 
identified that reduce national ratification delays and increase the probabilities 
of compliance. 
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) is a major 
milestone in the process of negotiating global and regional environmentdevelopment issues. It must 
be viewed as just that, a milestone in a much longer process. HopeFully, the insights reflected in this 
study will be useFul in supporting the development of meaningful agreements at UNCED. More 
importantly, though, it is our hope that these conclusions will be applicable as well to subsequent 
international environmental negotiation encounters to facilitate the development of efficient processes 
and effective solutions. 
